Full Idea
We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
Gist of Idea
If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs?
Source
C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
Book Reference
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' [CUP 2001], p.31
A Reaction
Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.