Single Idea 12310

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences]

Full Idea

Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.

Gist of Idea

Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties

Source

Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)

Book Reference

-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.717


A Reaction

Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.

Related Idea

Idea 12309 There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths [Aristotle]