Full Idea
Another answer to the question about the nature of logical consequence is a proof-theoretic one, according to which it is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation.
Gist of Idea
Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation
Source
Theodore Sider (Logic for Philosophy [2010], 1.5)
Book Reference
Sider,Theodore: 'Logic for Philosophy' [OUP 2010], p.8
A Reaction
I don't like this, and prefer the model-theoretic or substitutional accounts. Whether you can prove that something is a logical consequence seems to me entirely separate from whether you can see that it is so. Gödel seems to agree.
Related Ideas
Idea 13674 We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
Idea 13678 The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider]