Full Idea
The notion of grounding my capture a crucial mereological distinction (missing from classical mereology) between an integrated whole with genuine unity, and a mere aggregate. x is an integrated whole if it grounds its proper parts.
Gist of Idea
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't
Source
Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 3.1)
Book Reference
'Metametaphysics', ed/tr. Chalmers/Manley/Wasserman [OUP 2009], p.374
A Reaction
That gives a nice theoretical notion, but if you remove each of the proper parts, does x remain? Is it a bare particular? I take it that it will have to be an abstract principle, the one Aristotle was aiming at with his notion of 'form'. Schaffer agrees.