Full Idea
Jackson holds that conditionals are truth-functional, but are governed by rules of assertability, rather like 'but' compared to 'and'. The belief must be 'robust' - the speaker would not abandon his belief that A⊃B if he were to learn that A.
Gist of Idea
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident
Source
report of Frank Jackson (On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals [1979]) by Dorothy Edgington - Conditionals 17.3.2
Book Reference
'Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Goble,Lou [Blackwell 2001], p.404
A Reaction
This seems to spell out more precisely the pragmatic approach to conditionals pioneered by Grice, in Idea 13767. The idea is make conditionals 'fit for modus ponens'. They mustn't just be based on a belief that ¬A.
Related Idea
Idea 13767 Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]