Full Idea
Although a definite description looks like a complex name, and in many ways behaves like a name, still it cannot be a name if names must always refer to objects. Russell gave the first proposal for handling such expressions.
Gist of Idea
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer
Source
David Bostock (Intermediate Logic [1997], 8.3)
Book Reference
Bostock,David: 'Intermediate Logic' [OUP 1997], p.342
A Reaction
I take the simple solution to be a pragmatic one, as roughly shown by Donnellan, that sometimes they are used exactly like names, and sometimes as something else. The same phrase can have both roles. Confusing for logicians. Tough.
Related Idea
Idea 13813 Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]