Full Idea
Both the 'primary' and 'secondary' intension qualify as truths in virtue of meaning; they are simply true in virtue of different aspects of meaning.
Gist of Idea
In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
Source
David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.4)
Book Reference
Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.62
A Reaction
This is the view of two-dimensional semantics, which has split Fregean sense into an a priori and an a posterior part. Chalmers is trying to hang onto the idea that we might see necessity as largely analytic.
Related Ideas
Idea 13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
Idea 13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]