Single Idea 13961

[catalogued under 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics]

Full Idea

'Primary' truth-conditions tell us how the actual world has to be for an utterance of the statement to be true in that world; ....'secondary' truth-conditions give the truth-value in counterfactual worlds, given that the actual world turned out some way.

Gist of Idea

We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds

Source

David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 1.2.4)

Book Reference

Chalmers,David J.: 'The Conscious Mind' [OUP 1997], p.63


A Reaction

This is the reinterpretation of the truth-conditions account in terms of two-dimensional semantics. My first reaction is not very positive. Why can't we fix our references in counterfactual worlds, and then apply them to the actual (like inventions)?

Related Ideas

Idea 13958 The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]

Idea 13959 The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]