Single Idea 14229

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects]

Full Idea

Merricks agrees with van Inwagen that there are no composite objects, but disagrees with him about the semantics of talk about material objects.

Gist of Idea

Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics

Source

report of Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003]) by David Liggins - Nihilism without Self-Contradiction 4

Book Reference

'Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin,R [CUP 2008], p.184


A Reaction

Van Inwagen has one semantics for folk talk, and another semantics 'for the philosophy room'. Merricks seems to have an error theory of folk semantics (i.e. the folk don't understand what they are saying).