Single Idea 14574

[catalogued under 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation]

Full Idea

We could argue that there can be counterfactual dependence between events without causation, namely, cases of double prevention (an event preventing what would have prevented the second).

Gist of Idea

Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation

Source

S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.8)

Book Reference

Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.152


A Reaction

Since the whole idea of causation as counterfactual dependence strikes me as utterly counterintuitive, I don't really need these arguments, but it is nice to know that they can be found. Lewis devoted reams of discussion to such problems.