Full Idea
Are there two sorts of thing, propositions and states of affairs, or only one? I am inclined to the former view on the ground that propositions have a property, truth or falsehood, not had by states of affairs.
Gist of Idea
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one
Source
Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976], 1)
Book Reference
Plantinga,Alvin: 'Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality' [OUP 2003], p.108
A Reaction
Might a proposition be nothing more than an assertion that a state of affairs obtains? It would then pass his test. The idea that a proposition is a complex of facts in the external world ('Russellian' propositions?) quite baffles me.