Full Idea
If it is possible that there could be possible states of affairs that are not nomologically possible, don't we therefore need a notion of metaphysical possibility that outruns nomological possibility?
Gist of Idea
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility
Source
Sydney Shoemaker (Causal and Metaphysical Necessity [1998], VI)
Book Reference
Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.423
A Reaction
Shoemaker rejects this possibility (p.425). I sympathise. So there is 'natural' possibility (my preferred term), which is anything which stuff, if it exists, could do, and 'logical' possibility, which is anything that doesn't lead to contradiction.
Related Idea
Idea 16276 Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]