Single Idea 15180

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent]

Full Idea

Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case.

Gist of Idea

There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts

Source

Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4)

Book Reference

Sidelle,Alan: 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' [Cornell 1989], p.115


A Reaction

I file this under 'Dispositions' to show what is at stake in the debate about dispositional and categorical properties. I take a commitment to dispositions to be a commitment to modal facts about the actual world.