Full Idea
A moving thing is perceptually distinct from a motionless thing, but takes on no new quality. The perception of its motion is a genuine perception. Its motion is not inferred from observation of its successive occupations of different relative positions.
Gist of Idea
We perceive motion, and not just successive occupations of different positions
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II)
Book Reference
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.51
A Reaction
This seems to be a response to Russell's reductive 'at-at' account of motion, which always struck me as wrong. It doesn't prove Russell wrong, of course, and they are trying to demonstrate that we perceive causation directly.