Full Idea
Since discontinuities in a dense set of temporal points lead to doubts about the existential integrity of a thing, the thing-ontology demands that a dense time be continuous.
Gist of Idea
'Dense' time raises doubts about continuous objects, so they need 'continuous' time
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
Book Reference
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.111
A Reaction
This seems to be a rather unequivocal assertion about a rather uncertain topic. If quanta can move in 'leaps', which appear to abolish the notion of what happens 'between' two states, who can say what objects might manage to do?
Related Idea
Idea 15273 Points can be 'dense' by unending division, but must meet a tougher criterion to be 'continuous' [Harré/Madden]