Full Idea
Clavius' Paradox shows that a theorem-like structure organised by entailments cannot be identified as a scientific explanation by reference to syntactical criteria, since it shares its syntactic criteria with many other theorem-like structures.
Gist of Idea
Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse
Source
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 7.3)
Book Reference
Harré,R/Madden,E.H.: 'Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity' [Blackwell 1975], p.128
A Reaction
I think I was pretty convinced that a scientific theory had to meet more than mere syntactic criteria, before I encountered this idea. Lewis's account of laws may have to face this objection.
Related Idea
Idea 15283 Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden]