Full Idea
Lewis defines a globally intrinsic property as one that never varies between duplicates across possible worlds. This has the immediate problem that any property that is necessarily had, or necessarily lacked, by every thing will be intrinsic.
Gist of Idea
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic
Source
comment on David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], p.61-2) by Ross P. Cameron - Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties 'Analysis'
Book Reference
'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.268
A Reaction
[He also cites Langton and Lewis 1998] To me this is the sort of tangle you get into when you equate properties with predicates. The problem seems to concern necessary predicates (but those may not be necessary properties).
Related Idea
Idea 15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]