Full Idea
Kim suggest that 'extrinsic' properties are those that imply 'accompaniment' (coexisting with some wholly distinct contingent object), whereas 'intrinsic' properties are compatible with 'loneliness' (being un-accompanied).
Gist of Idea
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object
Source
report of Jaegwon Kim (Psychophysical supervenience [1982], 9th pg) by David Lewis - Extrinsic Properties II
Book Reference
Lewis,David: 'Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology' [CUP 1999], p.113
A Reaction
The aim of Kim and Lewis is to get the ontological commitment down to a minimum - in this case just to objects (and mysterious 'implications'!). I like nominalism, but you can't just deny properties. 'Loneliness' is extrinsic!