Full Idea
Given a realist view of dispositions as fully actual, even without manifestations or partners, a purely dispositional account of properties has a degree of plausibility, which is enhanced because properties lack purely qualitative characterisations.
Gist of Idea
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties
Source
C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 06.4)
Book Reference
Martin,C.B.: 'The Mind in Nature' [OUP 2008], p.60
A Reaction
In the end Martin opts for a mixed account, as in Idea 15484, but he gives reasons here for the view which I favour. If he concedes that dispositions may exist without manifestation, they must surely lack qualities. Are they not properties, then?
Related Idea
Idea 15484 A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB]