Full Idea
Quantification over (certain) properties can be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher, we can say 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom.
Gist of Idea
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true'
Source
Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1.1)
Book Reference
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.2
A Reaction
I love this, and think it is very important. He talks of 'mimicking' properties, but I see it as philosophers mistakenly attributing properties, when actually what they were doing is asserting truths involving certain predicates.