Full Idea
If Quine restricts himself to first-order predicate calculus, then the ontological implications concern the subjects of predicates. The nature of predicates, and what must be true for the predication, have disappeared from the radar screen.
Gist of Idea
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication
Source
comment on Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Tim Maudlin - The Metaphysics within Physics 3.1
Book Reference
Maudlin,Tim: 'The Metaphysics within Physics' [OUP 2007], p.83
A Reaction
Quine's response, I presume, is that the predicates can all be covered extensionally (red is a list of the red objects), and so a simpler logic will do the whole job. I agree with Maudlin though.
Related Idea
Idea 16260 Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]