Full Idea
Kripke's contribution was not to connect metaphysical and semantic issues, but to separate them: to provide a context in which questions about essences of things could be posed independently of assumptions about semantic rules of reference.
Gist of Idea
Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Reference and Necessity Intro
Book Reference
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Ways a World Might Be' [OUP 2003], p.167
A Reaction
In other words, Kripke set metaphysics free from the tyranny of Quine, and facilitated its modern rebirth. Bravo.
Related Idea
Idea 16394 Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke]