Single Idea 16457

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality]

Full Idea

One problem with Evans's argument that there are no such thing as vague identity statements is that its conclusion is plainly false. Example: 'Princeton = Princeton Borough', where it is unsettled what region 'Princeton' denotes.

Gist of Idea

There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion

Source

report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319

Book Reference

'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.319


A Reaction

Lewis endorses the view that vagueness is semantic. I certainly don't endorse Evans's argument, which hinges on a weird example of a property, as applied to Leibniz's Law.

Related Idea

Idea 16458 Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]