Single Idea 16460

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality]

Full Idea

The correct interpretation is that Evans trusts his reader (unwisely) to take for granted that there are vague identity statements, that a proof of the contrary cannot be right, and that the vagueness-in-describing view affords a diagnosis of the fallacy.

Gist of Idea

Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right

Source

report of Gareth Evans (Can there be Vague Objects? [1978]) by David Lewis - Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood p.319

Book Reference

'Vagueness: a Reader', ed/tr. Keefe,R /Smith,P [MIT 1999], p.319


A Reaction

[Lowe 199:11 is a culprit!] Lewis put this interpretation to Evans, who replied 'Yes, yes, yes!'.

Related Ideas

Idea 16458 Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis]

Idea 16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]