Full Idea
I do not think of 'possible worlds' as providing a reductive analysis in any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical view, of modal operators, propositions etc.
Gist of Idea
I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc.
Source
Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.19 n18)
Book Reference
Kripke,Saul: 'Naming and Necessity' [Blackwell 1980], p.19
A Reaction
I think this remark opens the door for Kit Fine's approach, of showing what modality is by specifying its sources. Possible worlds model the behaviour of modal inferences.
Related Idea
Idea 8941 We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]