Full Idea
If we accepted that counting objects always presupposes some sortal, it is surely clear that the class of objects to be counted could be designated by two sortals rather than one.
Gist of Idea
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
Source
M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Realist' vii)
Book Reference
-: 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.131
A Reaction
His nice example is an object which is both 'a single piece of wool' and a 'sweater', which had better not be counted twice. Wiggins struggles to argue that there is always one 'substance sortal' which predominates.
Related Idea
Idea 17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]