Single Idea 1777

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure]

Full Idea

Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good.

Gist of Idea

Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures

Source

report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60

Book Reference

Diogenes Laertius: 'Diogenes Laertius', ed/tr. Yonge,C.D. [Henry G. Bohn 1853], p.297


A Reaction

I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though.