Full Idea
If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results
Gist of Idea
If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied
Source
David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3)
Book Reference
Bostock,David: 'Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction' [Wiley-Blackwell 2009], p.252
A Reaction
I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important.
Related Ideas
Idea 18139 The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]
Idea 18151 Could we replace sets by the open sentences that define them? [Chihara, by Bostock]