Single Idea 18497

[catalogued under 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity]

Full Idea

It is the difficulty in imagining what truthmakers for normative judgements might be that leads many philosophers to find 'moral realism' unappealing.

Gist of Idea

Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements

Source

John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07)

Book Reference

Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.170


A Reaction

I like that a lot. My proposal for metaethics is that it should be built on the concept of a 'value-maker'

Related Ideas

Idea 18496 If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil]

Idea 18498 Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil]