Single Idea 18770

[catalogued under 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment]

Full Idea

There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment'

Gist of Idea

We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being

Source

C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6)

Book Reference

'Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R [Bloomsbury 2014], p.74


A Reaction

He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two.