Full Idea
Frege's theory of 'sense' showed how sentences with empty names can have meaning and be understood. One just has to grasp the sense of the sentence (the thought expressed), and this is available even in the absence of a referent for the name.
Gist of Idea
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 2
Book Reference
'Routledge Companion to Phil of Language', ed/tr. Russell/Graff Faria [Routledge 2015], p.154
A Reaction
My immediate reaction is that this provides a promising solution to the empty names problem, which certainly never bothered me before I started reading philosophy. Sawyer says co-reference and truth problems remain.
Related Ideas
Idea 13777 A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
Idea 18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
Idea 18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
Idea 18941 Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]