Full Idea
For a language L there is a predicate 'true-in-L' which one can employ for all scientific purposes in place of intuitive truth, and this predicate admits of a precise definition using only the vocabulary of L itself plus set theory.
Gist of Idea
For scientific purposes there is a precise concept of 'true-in-L', using set theory
Source
Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.2)
Book Reference
Putnam,Hilary: 'Philosophy of Logic' [Routledge 1972], p.21
A Reaction
He refers, of course, to Tarski's theory. I'm unclear of the division between 'scientific purposes' and the rest of life (which is why some people embrace 'minimal' theories of ordinary truth). I'm struck by set theory being a necessary feature.
Related Idea
Idea 10353 Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets [Kusch]