Single Idea 19075

[catalogued under 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth]

Full Idea

Unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that truth is a property of propositions that can be analyzed in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions propositions have, and the relation propositions stand in to them.

Gist of Idea

Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions

Source

James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.1


A Reaction

This is presumably because deflationary theories reject the external relations of a proposition as a feature of its truth. This evidently leaves them in need of a theory of meaning, which may be fairly minimal. Horwich would be an example.