Single Idea 19102

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence]

Full Idea

Peirce takes bivalence not to be a law of logic, but a regulative assumption of enquiry.

Gist of Idea

Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic

Source

report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Cheryl Misak - Pragmatism and Deflationism 2 n10

Book Reference

'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.75


A Reaction

I like this. For most enquiries it's either true or not true, it's either there or it's not there. When you aren't faced with these simple dichotomies (in history, or quantum mechanics) you can relax, and allow truth value gaps etc.