Full Idea
If truth is what satisfies our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry (as the pragmatist says), then there is no search for an elusive property, or a metaphysical property, or a property which we cannot grasp.
Gist of Idea
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries
Source
Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3)
Book Reference
'New Pragmatists', ed/tr. Misak,Cheryl [OUP 2009], p.79
A Reaction
This pragmatic approach is much more persuasive than the usual caricature of pragmatic truth (Idea 19097), but I'm beginning to wonder how you distinguish an 'inquiry' (or 'assertion') from other modes of thought. Do I smell a circularity?
Related Idea
Idea 19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]