Single Idea 19149

[catalogued under 19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental]

Full Idea

If we give up facts that make entities true, we ought to give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each depends on the legitimacy of the other.

Gist of Idea

If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'

Source

Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)

Book Reference

Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.41


A Reaction

Not sure about this, because I'm not sure I know what he means by 'representations'. Surely every sentence is 'about' something? Is that just the references within the sentence, but not the sentence as a whole?

Related Idea

Idea 14148 Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell]