Full Idea
Quine relates predicates to the things of which they can be predicated ...and hence predicates are 'true of' each and every thing of which the predicate can be truly predicated.
Gist of Idea
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them
Source
report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 5
Book Reference
Davidson,Donald: 'Truth and Predication' [Belknap Harvard 2005], p.114
A Reaction
Davidson comments that the virtue of Quine's view is negative, in avoiding a regress in the explanation of predication. I'm not sure about true 'of' as an extra sort of truth, but I like dropping predicates from ontology, and sticking to truths.
Related Idea
Idea 15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]