Single Idea 19350

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism]

Full Idea

I think we should keep both sides: we should be more Democritean and make all actions of bodies mechanical and independent of souls, and we should also be more than Platonic and hold that all actions of souls are immaterial and independent of mechanism.

Gist of Idea

We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius' [1705], [C])

Book Reference

Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Texts', ed/tr. Woolhouse R/Francks,R [OUP 1998], p.235


A Reaction

This is about as dualist as it is possible to get. It certainly looks as if many of Leibniz's doctrines are rebellions against Spinoza (in this case his 'dual aspect monism'). I take Leibniz to be utterly but heroically wrong.