Single Idea 19382

[catalogued under 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism]

Full Idea

I consider abstracta not as real things but as abbreviated ways of talking ...and to that extent I am a nominalist, at least provisionally ...It suffices to posit only substances as real things, and, to assert truths about these.

Gist of Idea

Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them

Source

Gottfried Leibniz (On the Reality of Accidents [1688]), quoted by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz

Book Reference

Arthur, Richard T.W.: 'Leibniz' [Polity 2014], p.147


A Reaction

I am a modern nominalist, in my hostility to a serious ontological commitment to abstracta. You get into trouble, though, if you say there are only objects or substances. Physics says reality may all be 'fields', or something.... 'Truths' is good.