Full Idea
Metaphysical disjunctivists hold that veridical perceptual experiences are not essentially the same as the experiences involved in corresponding cases involving illusion and (especially) hallucination.
Gist of Idea
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences
Source
Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 1.§4)
Book Reference
Pritchard,Duncan: 'Epistemological Disjunctivism' [OUP 2012], p.23
A Reaction
Metaphysical disjunctivism concerns what the experiences are; epistemological justification concerns the criteria of justification. I think. I wish Pritchard would spell things out more clearly. Indeed, I wish all philosophers would.
Related Idea
Idea 19496 Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]