Single Idea 19551

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure]

Full Idea

Those who deny skepticism but accept closure will have to explain how we know the various 'heavyweight' skeptical hypotheses to be false. Do we then twist the concept of knowledge to fit the twin desiderata of closue and anti-skepticism?

Gist of Idea

How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?

Source

John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], Intro)

Book Reference

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.41


A Reaction

[He is giving Dretske's view; Dretske says we do twist knowledge] Thus if I remember yesterday, that has the heavyweight implication that the past is real. Hawthorne nicely summarises why closure produces a philosophical problem.