Full Idea
If volitionism identifies the action with an act of will, this has the unpalatable consequence (for a Cartesian dualist) that walking does not happen in the material world. It would be the same act of walking if you had no legs, or no body at all.
Gist of Idea
If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 1 'Volitionism')
Book Reference
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.9
A Reaction
Is this attacking a caricature version of volitionism? Descartes would hardly subscribe to the view that no legs are needed for walking. If my legs spasmodically move without an act of will, we typically deny that this is an action.
Related Idea
Idea 20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]