Full Idea
Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts.
Gist of Idea
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
Book Reference
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.120
A Reaction
Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self.
Related Ideas
Idea 20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Idea 7116 When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]