Single Idea 2082

[catalogued under 2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence]

Full Idea

Just as primary elements are woven together, so their names may be woven together to produce a spoken account, because an account is essentially a weaving together of names.

Gist of Idea

A rational account is essentially a weaving together of things with names

Source

Plato (Theaetetus [c.364 BCE], 202b)

Book Reference

Plato: 'Theaetetus', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [Penguin 1987], p.116


A Reaction

If justification requires 'logos', and logos is a 'weaving together of names', then Plato might be taken as endorsing the coherence account of justification. Or do the two 'weavings' correspond?