Single Idea 21505

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism]

Full Idea

It is simply not necessary in order for [the coherence] view to yield justification to suppose that cognitively spontaneous beliefs have some degree of initial or independent credibility.

Gist of Idea

A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility

Source

Laurence Bonjour (The Structure of Empirical Knowledge [1985], 7.2)

Book Reference

Bonjour,Laurence: 'The Structure of Empirical Knowledge' [Harvard 1985], p.147


A Reaction

This is thoroughly and rather persuasively criticised by Erik Olson. But he always focuses on the coherence of a 'system' with multiple beliefs. I take the credibility of each individual belief to need coherent assessment against a full background.