Full Idea
Russell's theory involved defining a term not by presenting a direct equivalent of it, but by 'paraphrasis', providing equivalents of the sentences. In this way, reference to fictitious objects can be simulated without our being committed to the objects.
Gist of Idea
Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects
Source
Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75)
Book Reference
Quine,Willard: 'Theories and Things' [Harvard 1981], p.75
A Reaction
I hadn't quite grasped that the modern strategy of paraphrase tracks back to Russell - though it now looks obvious, thanks to Quine. Paraphrase is a beautiful way of sidestepping ontological problems. See Frege on the moons of Jupiter.
Related Ideas
Idea 8645 Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege]
Idea 21700 Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]