Single Idea 22472

[catalogued under 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice]

Full Idea

I wonder whether the practice of justice may not absolutely require a certain recognition of equality between human beings, not a pretence of the equality of talents, but something deeper.

Gist of Idea

The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality

Source

Philippa Foot (Nietzsche's Immoralism [1991], p.152)

Book Reference

Foot,Philippa: 'Moral Dilemmas' [OUP 2002], p.152


A Reaction

{My 'something deeper' is expressed by Foot in a quotation from Gertrude Stein]. This may well be the most fundamental division which runs across a society - between those who accept and those reject human equality.