Full Idea
In Tyler Burge's view we have an a priori entitlement for believing what others tell us, other things being equal.
Gist of Idea
Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony
Source
Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 1.3 n11)
Book Reference
Fricker,Miranda: 'Epistemic Injustice' [OUP 2007], p.18
A Reaction
[Burge 'Content Preservation' 1992] Close to Davidson's Charity (that without a default assumption of truth-speaking language won't work at all). Davidson is right about casual conversation, but for important testimony Burge should be more cautious.
Related Idea
Idea 23549 We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M]