Full Idea
The pro- and con- attitudes of the expressivists count as 'moral' only if they are had towards particular people, actions or states of affairs in virtue of their natural features, ….rather than in virtue of being the particulars that they are.
Gist of Idea
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 2.4)
Book Reference
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.24
A Reaction
So whereas emotivists don't have to have any reasons for their moral feelings, other expressivists seem to require reasons (i.e. indicating features of things) to endorse their attitudes. What of reasonless emotionless attitudes?
Related Idea
Idea 23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]