Full Idea
The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications.
Gist of Idea
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives
Source
Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1)
Book Reference
Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.63
A Reaction
[Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'.
Related Ideas
Idea 23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
Idea 23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]